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I. INTRODUCTION
Complexity in the law inspires much confusion. In some respects,
however, we are quite sure of ourselves. We think, for example, that
we can easily recognize legal complexity when we see it. We are also
sure that the law is often too complex.1 We do allow for the possible
advantages of complexity in certain cases.2 Generally, though, we assume that what is simple is both readily recognized and desirable.

* Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; Visiting Professor,
Michigan State University College of Law, 2000-2001.
1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); see also
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY ix (1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 138
(1991) (“When the law takes the form of clear, comprehensive, objective, and preannounced
rules, litigation is mostly a waste of time.”); Craig J. Albert, The Deceptive Allure of Simplicity, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1414, 1414 (1996) (“[T]he drive for simplicity has been the
motivating force behind the major movements in legal scholarship of this century, beginning with Legal Realism.”); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1974); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1990); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum
Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 195 (1998)
(arguing that the complexity of the minimum contacts test “has hampered rather than improved the test”); Ellen Wertheimer, Calabresi’s Razor: A Short Cut to Responsibility, 28
STETSON L. REV. 105, 105 (1998) (noting that Ockham’s Razor of simplification is “even
more applicable in the legal realm than in the scientific”); Ellen Wertheimer, Pursuing
Health in an Era of Change: Emerging Legal Issues in Managed Care, 43 VILL. L. REV.
321, 321 (1998).
2. See Albert, supra note 1; see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:
Against Simple Rules For a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997); Eric W.
Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1441
(1995) (book review); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1992).

716

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:715

Culturally, we have long linked the simple with the true and the
good.3
But all this is overly simple. Complexity in the law is much more
complex than we imagine. There are, it turns out, any number of
more or less separate and independent kinds of complexity in the
law. We can reduce legal complexity in one respect without also reducing the law’s complexity in other respects, and usually only at the
cost of greater complexity in other respects. Which forms of complexity in the law are most important will require highly contestable
value judgments. These value judgments are often deeply political.
Even when we do seem to reduce legal complexity in accordance with
our own debatable value preferences, we often only succeed in shifting inescapable complexities forward or backward in time, or to a different stage of the law making and law enforcement process. Ultimately, to say in any given case that we have simplified the law is at
best to oversimplify what we have done, and at worst to mislead our
audience.
The discussion below begins by inventorying some of the forms of
complexity in the law and then introducing some of the complications
of legal complexity. After a brief nod in the direction of complex litigation4 and complexity theory in mathematics and science,5 we contrast Lon Fuller’s discussion of ‘polycentricity’ with Richard Epstein’s
emphasis on the costs of complying with some legal provision.6 We
then focus on legal complexity as a matter of sheer number. In particular, we consider complexity as a matter of the sheer number of
elements or components of a legal code or system, the number of assumptions underlying a legal rule, the number of proscriptions imposed upon legal actors, and the number of distinctions or exceptions

3. Ockham’s Razor suggests that we not multiply entities or hypotheses unnecessarily. See, e.g., Lewis Feuer, The Principle of Simplicity, 24 PHIL. SCI. 109, 109 (1957); Elliott
Sober, The Principle of Parsimony, 32 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 145, 145 (1981). More positively,
it has been argued that “[t]he most persuasive lines of reasoning . . . are usually fairly simple trains of thought.” THOMAS V. MORRIS, MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL 66 (1997). Historically, simplicity was often thought of as a divine attribute. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS 1088B28, 304 (Richard Hope trans., 1960); ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD
153 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans., 1958); BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS
AQUINAS 44-45 (1993); MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED OF
MAIMONIDES 89 (M. Friedlander trans., 1956); Katherin Rogers, The Traditional Doctrine
of Divine Simplicity, 32 RELIG. STUD. 165, 165 (1996). Whether simplicity is actually a useful guide to the truth, however, has been doubted. See, e.g., Steven O. Kimbrough, On
Simplicity as a Guide to Truth, 9 KINESIS 55, 70 (1979); Keith Lehrer, Against Simplicity
in Philosophical Analysis 119, 122 (David F. Austin ed., 1988); ROBERT NOZICK, Simplicity
as Fall-Out, in HOW MANY QUESTIONS? 105, 105 (Leigh S. Cauman et al. eds., 1983) (“It is
difficult to think of any reasonable explanation for why . . . a simplicity maxim should help
. . . arrive at the truth.”).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 22-25.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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embodied in a legal rule or code.7 This sort of numerical complexity
can occur at any level of a legal system, from individual judicial cases
to statutes to codes to the legal system as a whole. Even these sorts
of purely numerical determinations by themselves are not particularly easy. How many assumptions, for example, underlie our current
tax code, the Constitution, the free speech clause, or, for that matter,
the French Constitution? Will these numbers ever be objective and
uncontroversial?
A further complication is that undeniably, legal complexity is not
simply a matter of sheer number. All else equal, the greater the variety or differences among its parts, the more complex something is.8
The number of elements of a legal system, for example, does not tell
us much about the diversity of those elements. But even this complication is too static. The complexity of any portion of a legal system, or
of the legal system itself, is also partly a matter of its functional or
operational complexity.9 There is a difference between the variety of
a system’s elements and the complexity of their mutual interaction.
We can hardly understand legal complexity without considering, in
particular, the legal system’s supposedly layered, hierarchical complexity,10 and more broadly the legal system’s interrelational and organizational complexity.11
Cutting across these forms of legal complexity are, inescapably,
the intimidatingly named dimensions of ontological, epistemic, and
pragmatic complexity.12 We shall define and address these forms of
complexity in turn. Related to epistemic and pragmatic complexity
are the more familiar ideas of formal, notational, and stylistic complexity.13 Stylistic complexity, in turn, is subdivided into semantic
and syntactic complexity.14 Legal complexity, it turns out, is almost
endlessly subdividable, and itself almost indefinitely complex.
These dimensions of legal complexity are not exhaustive, but they
will suffice to illustrate the major problems. We will then discuss the
crucial factor of the typical absence, at best, of any positive correlation among the various forms of legal complexity.15 Judgments as to
what is legally complex and what is legally simple are therefore indeed mere judgments, somehow reflecting the strength and weakness
of the various interests at stake and potentially quite contestable.16
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra text accompanying notes 45-49.
See infra text accompanying note 50.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
See infra text accompanying notes 63-70.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-78, 88-90.
See infra text accompanying notes 104-106.
See infra text accompanying notes 111-116.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
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These sorts of typically political judgments are thus deeply evaluative17 and deeply complex themselves. To these complexities we add
another: what appears to be “really” complex may seem simpler, and
vice versa, if we translate or merely redescribe the particular law
into other terms.18
As it turns out, legal complexity is more complex, and more unavoidable, than even this much suggests. Even if we could all agree
that through some reform we are simplifying a particular law in
some particular respect, often we would only be displacing the legal
complexity we started with, by shifting that complexity backward or
forward in the legal system, or onto some other stage of the broader
political process.19 We may fairly conclude that for all these reasons,
complexity in the law cannot simply be reduced in any reasonably
uncontroversial way. Simplifying the law in general, or even some
particular area of the law, takes on the profitlessness of the proverbial wild goose chase.
II. SOME DIMENSIONS OF COMPLEXITY: LEGAL
COMPLEXITY AS ITSELF COMPLEX
There are a number of kinds of complexity to be found in the law.
The number of different kinds of legal complexity reflects the variety
of interests we may have at stake in the law. As our legal interests
are not entirely permanently fixed,20 we should not expect to produce
an exhaustive list of all of the dimensions of legal complexity. As our
interests conflict and evolve, new forms of complexity in the law may
arise, or, at the very least, old forms of legal complexity may take on
greater or lesser importance. A complete and final assessment of all
of the kinds of complexity in the law is therefore impossible.
A.

Ambiguous Complexity

An initial complication is that the very idea of complexity in the
law is itself already ambiguous. For example, an area of law designated “complex litigation” already exists.21 Complex litigation in this

17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. The stakes that various groups have in either promoting stability in the law or in
destabilizing the law may change over time. See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 614 (1983) (discussing the problem
of instituting destabilization rights).
21. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER’S STUDY: A MODEL SYSTEM FOR STATETO-STATE TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION (1994); BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 8-9 (1970);
RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
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technical sense has itself proved difficult to define precisely.22 It
seems to involve, at a minimum, multiple party and multi-district
litigation.23 These factors by themselves certainly do not nearly exhaust the various dimensions of legal complexity in the broader
sense we are concerned with. There is, however, some degree of overlap between the complexity of complex litigation and legal complexity
in our broader sense. The multiplicity of parties and jurisdictions in
litigation are certainly forms of complexity in our sense, and it seems
reasonable to suppose that increasing the number of parties and jurisdictions involved in a lawsuit often tends to complicate the legal
issues involved or to raise some costs for some parties.24
There is also complexity in the sense of “complexity theory,” as
developed by mathematicians and scientists to describe some behaviors of dynamic systems.25 Complexity in this mathematical sense
typically involves systems with an irreducibly large number of elements, evolving dynamically over time without reaching a stable
long-term equilibrium.26 Crucially, such systems often feature “shortrange” or “neighborhood” interactions among their elements that result in dramatic discontinuities, “tipping,” “avalanches,” or emergent
properties and disproportional effects,27 with the locally interacting
elements commonly not “aware of” the overall effect on the system.28
Something akin to this mathematical sense of complexity may
well be exhibited in legal systems.29 At the very least, we can think of
ON ADVANCED CIVIL
COMPLEX LITIGATION

PROCEDURE (1998); JAMES L. STENGEL & ANDREW M. CALAMARI,
(1994).
22. See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1692 (1992) (“Other than the rich
diversity of the proposals, the most striking feature of the commentary on complex litigation is the lack of agreement about a definition for the subject.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1987) (stating that “‘[c]omplex
litigation’ means different things to different people”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 785 n.12 (1998) (quoting Burbank, supra.).
23. See Stempel, supra note 22, at 786.
24. Cf. Burbank, supra note 22, at 1481 (“Litigation may be called complex because of
the joinder of multiple parties, the difficulty of the issues involved, or the volume of discovery and evidence necessitating substantial court administration. Sometimes, however,
cases take on complexities by virtue of their relationship to other cases.”).
25. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Democracy’s Discontents in a Complex World: Can
Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel’s Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2086 (1997) (“Complexity theory, which includes chaos and catastrophe theory, is an overarching field of mathematical analysis of the behavior of nonlinear
dynamic systems.”). For popular treatments, see, for example, JOHN L. CASTI,
COMPLEXIFICATION (1994); James P. Crutchfield et al., Chaos, in CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY
35 (Robert John Russell et al. eds., 1995).
26. See, e.g., PAUL CILLIERS, COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM 3-4 (1998).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-andSociety System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative
State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); see also Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49
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some important legal phenomena as analogous to the processes examined by mathematical complexity theory. Consider, for example, a
large corporation sued in connection with the manufacture and sale
of a widely used but allegedly defective product.30 The first few plaintiffs might, conceivably, recover compensatory and even punitive
damages in independent, uncoordinated actions. It is also imaginable, however, that at some point the addition of a single otherwise
indistinguishable plaintiff may “tip” the defendant into filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, representing a dramatic discontinuity in the legal relationships of all the parties.
We shall not, however, focus solely on circumstances that can be
analogized to this mathematical sort of complexity. We will, nevertheless, continue to use the term “complexity,” understanding that
complexity in our broad sense might be synonymous with something
like “complicatedness” beyond complexity in any technical sense.
Complexity in our own homespun, garden-variety sense of “complicatedness” can be found in the law at many different points. This
is itself a complication, as there is no guarantee that complexity will
mean the same thing, or even have similar effects, regardless of what
kind of element of the law it is attached to. We can certainly think of
litigation as being complex,31 but it is also possible to think of the
pretrial,32 trial,33 and post-trial remedy or appeal34 stages of litigation
as themselves complicated, though perhaps in different ways. More
analytically, we can see complexity as an attribute, in one way or another, of legal rules,35 legal processes,36 legal institutions,37 and of the
supporting culture.38
B. Polycentricity vs. Cost of Compliance
Many aspects of the law thus can be described as complex. Admittedly, this concept by itself cannot show that complexity in the law is

RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997) (focusing on computational complexity theory in particular);
J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administration, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 405, 460 (1997).
30. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988)
(discussing Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 B.R. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1983), aff’d, 40 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
32. See Tidmarsh, supra note 23, at 1701.
33. See id. at 1704.
34. See id. at 1707.
35. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures,
42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. Substantively, Professor Schuck distinguishes among “density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty” as dimensions or features of legal
complexity. See id.
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a complicated idea. Complexity shows up in many different legal contexts, but more importantly, legal complexity also takes on many
guises. Legal complexity means a number of different things, along a
number of different dimensions. These diverse meanings of legal
complexity clearly cannot be reduced to one, or even a few, more basic general meanings. Even more importantly for our purposes, these
various meanings of legal complexity certainly do not all strongly
positively correlate with one another, and may not positively correlate with each other at all.
Consider, merely for the sake of an initial example, two mutually
irreducible forms of complexity in the law. First, think of Lon Fuller’s
idea of polycentricity in the law. A polycentric dispute is, roughly,
one in which any resolution is likely to have difficult-to-predict, indirect consequences for the parties and for other groups perhaps not
directly represented in the legal dispute.39 As Fuller expressed it,
“the more interacting centers there are, the more the likelihood that
one of them will be affected by a change in circumstances, and, if the
situation is polycentric, this change will communicate itself after a
complex pattern to other centers.”40
Fuller is thus clearly discussing a general form of complexity that
may characterize the law, or at least some aspects of the law. This
form of legal complexity cannot be reduced to or somehow translated
into all of the other forms, however. Consider, for example, Richard
Epstein’s understanding of complexity in the law. Professor Epstein
specifies that on his view, “[a]ny rule that explicitly begins with [the
words ‘unless otherwise agreed’] cannot . . . constitute a complex rule,
for those who do not like what it provides will run and hide from its
application.”41 In applying Epstein’s approach, then, variables like
the unavoidable costs of complying with a rule will be crucial to assessing the degree of complexity of the rule, along with whatever else
legal complexity may involve.42
Neither Fuller’s nor Epstein’s approach need be held out as the
basis for a full and comprehensive understanding of complexity in
the law. Our point is, first, that even with the greatest ingenuity,
polycentricity cannot be reduced to anything like rule compliance
39. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 30, at 476-78; Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process, and the Judiciary As an Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 284-85 (1997) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)); Tidmarsh,
supra note 23, at 1728.
40. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 397
(1978).
41. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27.
42. See id. at 25-27; Joseph P. Tomain, Book Review: Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 409, 411 (1996); see also Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., supra note 29, at 470
(citing compliance costs as one element of “structural complexity” in the law); McCaffery,
supra note 1, at 1271-72 (distinguishing “structural complexity” in his sense of the term
from “compliance complexity”).
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costs. Similarly, rule compliance costs cannot be reduced to anything
like polycentricity. More crucially for our purposes, polycentricity
certainly does not seem even to be strongly associated or correlated
with relatively high compliance costs. Either form of legal complexity
might well be present without the other.
Suppose, for example, we have a statute that is quite simple in
Epstein’s sense. Consider a broad federal statute extensively regulating, pensions, labor relations, or the sale of securities but prefaced by
Epstein’s opt-out language allowing the most directly affected parties
to agree simply not to be bound by the remaining statutory terms,
and to substitute their own agreement. Or consider a no-fault divorce
statute that admits of no opt-out, but which can otherwise be complied with at low cost. Accordingly, these statutes are simple on Epstein’s understanding. But does this mean that the statutes are also
not complex in Fuller’s sense of polycentricity? Hardly. Even with
their opt-out provisions and low compliance costs, these statutes may
well have unpredictable and important indirect long-term consequences for many persons other than those most directly involved.
That a statute permits the most directly affected persons to contract around the remainder of the statute hardly means that other
individuals are not indirectly affected. If a statute allowed employers
and employees to contract around an elaborate pension system in exchange for higher current income, spouses, dependents, and other
more remote third parties could be substantially and unpredictably
affected. Conversely, suppose a statute is inescapable and otherwise
has high compliance costs. From Epstein’s standpoint, the statute is
therefore complex. Does this mean, necessarily, that the statute and
its implementation and enforcement are more polycentric than other
sorts of statutes? Why could a statute not be costly to comply with
but largely focused, in its effects, on the parties involved?43
Thus we should hardly expect legal complexity in Fuller’s sense
and in Epstein’s sense to be inseparable. Instead, we may well encounter either form of complexity in the absence of the other. When
we consider the variety of other forms of legal complexity, we find,
certainly, no broad pattern of any positive mutual correlation. Some
forms of complexity may well tend to positively correlate with certain
other forms. However, some forms of legal complexity will not tend to
vary along with other sorts, or may even vary inversely.

43. Arguably all statutes generate polycentricity issues. Surely, however, not all statutes are equally polycentric in their effects. However overdrawn it may occasionally be, the
distinction between legislation that is mainly paternalistic and legislation that is less paternalistic is not simply an illusion. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (reprint
ed. 1989); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1983); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC
INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE (1986).
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C. Variance and Numbers
Complexity in the law is often thought of, for example, in terms
quite remote from either Fuller’s polycentricity or Epstein’s compliance costs. Perhaps most obviously, we often associate complexity,
whether of a legal rule, an opinion, a judicial code, an entire legal
system, or apart from the law, with something like the number of
elements or components involved.44 The greater the number of parts
the greater the complexity, all else equal.45
Once we recognize that the number of constituent elements of
some broader object bears on its complexity, however, we are likely to
conclude that this dimension, too, cannot be the sole measure of complexity. If we were asked, for example, whether one mosaic tile pattern was more complex than another, we might well care about the
sheer number of tiles constituting each mosaic, but that would
hardly exhaust the matter. If we think about the complexity of legal
theories, statutes, codes, or even of legal systems, we might ask not
only about the number of their elements, but also about the number
of assumptions or postulates underlying the theory, provisions, or
system at issue.46
Surely there is a difference between the number of component
parts of a system and the number of assumptions or postulates we
must entertain in order to explain or justify the operation of that system. If the free speech clause has, let us simply assume, only one
part—and this itself is debatable—would we therefore assume that
there can also only be one important assumption, value, or purpose
underlying the free speech clause? If we detected four assumptions
underlying the free speech clause, would we also expect to find four
parts to that clause?
There can be variations on the legal complexity theme as a matter
of sheer number. We might, for example, combine the concern for
number with Professor Epstein’s emphasis on compliance costs to see
the law’s complexity as a matter of the number of prohibitions embodied in the law.47 Or we might choose to see complexity also as
44. See, e.g., NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 1, 9
(1998); Janice Toran, ‘Tis a Gift To Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 352, 361 (1990).
45. Recognizing that complexity is partly a matter of the sheer number of elements or
components involved hardly suggests that this is the only form of, or all that matters with
respect to, complexity. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9; Toran, supra note 44, at 361.
46. See, e.g., RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL 12 (rev. ed. 1997);
George Schlesinger, The Principle of Simplicity and Verifiability, 26 PHIL. SCI. 41, 41
(1959). For commentary on Swinburne’s approach, see Don Fawkes & Tom Smythe, Simplicity and Theology, 32 REL. STUD. 259, 259 (1996).
47. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27 (“If under one legal system a factory . . .
may be built without any prior government approval, then that system is simpler than one
which requires approval by a local zoning board . . .”); Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., supra note 29, at
470.
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partly a matter of the number of distinctions drawn by, or exceptions
built into, a law.48 It seems evident that the number of exceptions
and distinctions built into a set of legal rules need not be a function
of the sheer number of rules. Consider a variant of the game of
checkers with an enormous number of pieces, but in which no functional or operational distinctions are drawn among the pieces. Each
player has, let us say, hundreds of identical pieces, moving in one
single invariant fashion. Surely, we would not see this game as extreme in its complexity.
Complexity, though, cannot be confined to matters of sheer number. If we think again of the mosaic’s complexity, we will want to
consider not just the number of tiles, but something like the variety
of tiles as well. Similarly, the complexity of a legal code or legal system will depend in part on the degree of variety or differences among
its constituent parts.49 Just as the greater complexity of chess—
relative to checkers—is, in part, a matter of the greater variety of
chess pieces, so legal complexity reflects the degree of variance
among constituent parts.
The number of elements constituting a legal rule or system, thus,
need not be strongly correlated with the degree of differentiation
among those elements. A game of checkers, as modified above to provide for hundreds of identical checkers on both sides, would, in this
respect, be numerically far more complex than an ordinary game of
chess. Chess, on the other hand, would still be more complex than
any version of checkers with respect to differentiation among kinds of
pieces.
1. Tax Code Example
Correspondingly, we can imagine a tax code that carefully listed,
for each dollar increment in income, the ultimate tax due. This tax
code could have millions, if not billions, of component sections, corresponding to every level of income in dollar units. We might wish to
say that this code really involves merely one very large tax table, but
there is no reason in principle why it could not formally be arranged
as a series of separate sections governing each single dollar income
48. See, e.g., Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 884-85 (N.C. 1998) (quoting O’Leary
v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977)) (noting that a number of categorical exceptions and distinctions render premises liability law complex and confusing); Louis Kaplow,
A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 150, 150 (1995)
(recognizing complexity as “the number and difficulty of distinctions the rules make”);
Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 268 (1989); Lance W. Rook, Laying Down the Law: Canons For
Drafting Complex Legislation, 72 OR. L. REV. 663, 670 (1993) (statutory cross-references as
adding to complexity).
49. See, e.g., RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9; SWINBURNE, supra note 46, at 13-14;
Toran, supra note 44, at 361.
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level. A person with a taxable income of, say, $27,253 would simply
go to the single corresponding line of the tax table.
This possibility suggests two useful points. First, what is on some
definitions quite complex—as a million section tax code would be
complex in terms of sheer number of elements—may be easily rewritable in far fewer sections, involving one large tax table. As easily
rewritten, a code loses its complexity in this numerical sense, and becomes much simpler. Thus millions of code sections can easily be reduced to one single, comprehensive code section. This begins to suggest the superficiality, or the mere stylistic conventionality, if not the
sheer arbitrariness of some judgments of complexity.
Second, while the tax code with millions of separate sections is
complex in some senses—it has many working parts, and may be difficult or impossible to evade or contract around50—in other respects,
such a code is relatively simple. The millions of separate provisions
are not, for example, all qualitatively different possible ways in
which one’s interest income or capital gains might be treated, all of
which one may need to consider.51 Instead, one should, by our assumption, be able to move quickly to the single section corresponding
to one’s own income level52 and instantly read one’s final tax obligation from that section. The code sections, while numerous, are simple
in some respects that we have already seen and in other respects we
have yet to examine.53 Here again, various senses of complexity, even
when they are not being reformulated in ways that make them simple, do not positively correlate with other senses of complexity.
To this point, however, we have still left the problem of legal complexity vastly oversimplified. Imagine again a mosaic with a large
number of tiles, and this time with a large variety of colors of tiles,
but in which the tiles were arrayed in one simple endlessly repeated
pattern: in the order corresponding to the visible light spectrum.
Surely we would not see this simple and endlessly repeated pattern
as approaching anything like the maximally complex mosaic.54 But
even a more interesting pattern is not the end of the complexity
story.
50. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that non-evadable provisions are more
complex than those that can be contracted around).
51. See id. (hypothetically referring to twenty-five possible tax treatments of interest
income).
52. We shall set aside the simplicities, or complexities, involved in determining one’s
taxable income in the first place.
53. Crucial, of course, is that anyone can turn immediately to the single relevant section, and quickly and easily grasp its decisive import.
54. For discussion of alternative mosaic tiling patterns that are simple in some respects, yet rather more complex in others, consider the concept of Penrose tiles, as developed by Roger Penrose. See Joseph Malkevitch, Tilings and Patterns, 236 SCIENCE 996
(1987); see also John Horgan, Quantum Consciousness: Polymath Roger Penrose Takes On
the Ultimate Mystery, 261 SCI. AM. 30 (1989).
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2. Functional/Operational Complexity
At a minimum, we must now add the idea of the functional or operational complexity of the elements of a legal system. If we think of
chess as more complex than checkers, this is not merely because
chess pieces vary more in their appearances or shapes, or even because the pattern of their initial deployment is more complex, but because chess pieces vary more in their functions, uses, and powers of
movement.55 In this respect, a legal system that relied solely on a series of decrees would be less complex than a legal system in which
constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, executive orders, attorney general opinions, decrees, and other sorts of
law all played their diverse roles.56 These elements of a legal system
could be diverse not only in content, but in their function or operation as well. They could vary along the dimensions of their jurisdictional scope, the actors addressed by the law, the officials authorized
to carry out the law, the degree of authoritativeness of the law, or
even the degree of coerciveness involved.57
Functional or operational complexity is partially a matter of hierarchy, either within a particular statute,58 for example, or more
broadly, as among the varied elements of a legal system.59 The
greater the number of hierarchical legal levels, all else equal, the
more functionally or operationally complex the system is likely to be.
Thus, federal constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and federal
regulations addressing equality, along with state law at various levels on the same subject, add complexity to the law of equality. But
then, interestingly, any blurriness or equivocality in what might superficially seem to be a clear vertical legal hierarchy60 can also be a
form of complexity. The presence of clear hierarchical levels in a legal
system may add to its complexity, but so does lack of clarity or lack of
“strictness” in a purported hierarchy of levels.61
55. This example is used in RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9.
56. For some of the complexities involved in sorting out the genuine differences in legal function or operation, see R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1357 (1991).
57. Some laws, such as those prohibiting theft, are mandatory and coercive at their
essence, whereas others, such as those establishing the essentials of a valid, legally enforceable will, are more directly a matter of empowerment or social coordination. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (2d ed. 1994).
58. See, e.g., Rook, supra note 48, at 670 (“[T]he more tiers there are in a provision,
the more complex it will be.”).
59. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9 (referring to “elaborateness of subordination relationships in the modes of inclusion and subsumption”). For some historic discussion, see
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (discussing federal-state judicial relations)
and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (discussing federal-state legislative relations).
60. See Wright, supra note 56, at 1381.
61. Relationships of authority can be difficult to trace because what appear to be
strictly hierarchical relationships really involve mutual incorporation or mutual influence.
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Functional or operational complexity, however, is hardly exhausted by matters of hierarchy. Broader issues of the degree of organizational elaborateness and interrelatedness also arise. The parts
of a legal system may be related to each other in more or less complex ways, whether they are arranged in a neat hierarchy or not. A
system might be organized, for example, in a neat pyramidal structure, with a strict hierarchy of levels. But this may tell us little about
the degree of the system’s complexity. If we build a pyramid out of
sugar cubes as a school project, have we built a complex entity?
A pyramid of sugar cubes, even if multi-layered, does not suggest
variety of constituent elements, or, more crucially, any sense of intricacy, elaborateness of organizational or structural scheme, or anything like richness and profusion. The sugar cubes do not interact
among one another in a variety of interesting ways, qualify or amplify each other’s impact, feed back on one another, or cross-reference
one another.62 Some cubes might even be removed without much affecting distant or even nearby cubes.
D. Organizational and Relational Complexity
Complexity, whether of a legal or nonlegal sort, is, in some measure, a matter of organizational complexity.63 Organizational complexity in turn may be a reflection of something like the elaborateness of
structural64 interrelationships65 among the parts of a system. The
greater the number and variety of ways in which the parts of a legal
system interact, all else equal, the greater the complexity.66 Structural or relational complexity may even involve a sense of extravagance,67 intricacy,68 or elaborateness.69
Relational complexity in a system may sometimes be associated
with great numbers of elements of the system. But as the sugar cube
pyramid suggests, we may also find great numbers of elements of a
system, but little interactive complexity. On the other hand, everyday experience with other people teaches us that relational complex62. We have already referred above to the density of cross-referencing among provisions as a dimension of complexity. See Rook, supra note 48, at 670.
63. See, e.g., RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9 (referring to the “variety of different possible ways of arranging components in different modes of interrelationship”).
64. See, e.g., Richard Rudner, An Introduction to Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 109, 110
(1961) (referring, inter alia, to a structural dimension of simplicity or complexity).
65. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 29, at 413 (referring to “interconnectedness” as a dimension of tax law complexity) (quoting John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and
Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12
(1993)).
66. See, e.g., SWINBURNE, supra note 46, at 13.
67. See S.F. Barker, On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses, 28 PHIL. SCI. 162, 165
(1961).
68. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 8.
69. See id.
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ity can be found in the absence of great numbers of system elements.
Notoriously, we can find great complexity of relationship between as
few as two individual persons.70 We should not, therefore, expect a
particularly strong correlation between complexity as sheer number
and complexity as intricacy of relationship.
One could easily argue, for example, that there is greater complexity in the relationship between two elements of the first amendment—the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause71—
than there is between either of these clauses and the Second through
Eighth Amendments combined.72 But then, the first eight amendments may seem complex in some ways that may largely evaporate
merely by changing our conventional frames of reference, or by translating one language of description into another.73 The first eight
amendments may involve complex interrelationships that may come
to seem less important if we reconceive of that series of separate provisions as, instead, an underlyingly unified single entity known as
the Bill of Rights.74
E. Ontological and Epistemical Complexity
As it turns out, even the various forms of legal complexity relate
to one another in complex ways. Cutting across all of the above forms
of complexity is a distinction between what we might call ontological
complexity and epistemic complexity.75 A system, including a legal
system, is ontologically complex if it is somehow in itself complex,
70. See, e.g., the relationship between Dorothea and Mr. Casaubon in GEORGE ELIOT,
MIDDLEMARCH (David Carroll ed., 1986), between Anna and Count Vronsky in LEO
TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (Constance Garnett trans., 1939), or between Edmund and
Fanny in JANE AUSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK (1995).
71. See generally Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of
Permissible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127 (1990);
Scott J. Ward, Note, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class
Actions, 98 YALE L.J. 1739 (1989).
72. The relationship between the Establishment Clause and, say, the bearing of arms,
the quartering of soldiers, or the right to grand jury indictment seems not so much complex
as merely contingent, or generally uninteresting. See, respectively, U.S. CONST. amends. I,
III, IV & V.
73. See, e.g., Mario Bunge, The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction of Assaying of
Scientific Theories, 59 J. PHIL. 120, 121 (1962) (referring to the possibility of reducing
many postulates, by merely conjoining them, to one).
74. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131
(1991). This is not to deny that in light of other interests we may have, the complexity of
relationships among the first eight amendments, or between one or more of those amendments and other provisions of the Constitution, may seem more important. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); see also, Akhil
Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143 (1998). Professor Amar refers to both “intratextual” cross-references within the Constitution, and “intertextual” cross-references between the Bill of Rights and earlier historical documents. See
id. at 1143
75. This distinction is widely recognized and discussed, but it is emphasized in
RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9.
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apart from how simple or complex it is to understand (epistemically)
or linguistically describe that system.76 This distinction seems controversial: Is there really a way that a legal system is, in itself, apart
from the ways it is described? Ultimately, though, this often seems to
be a valid distinction, in that we can think of simple objects that are
difficult to describe and complex objects that can be easily described.
A photon, the basic unit of light, no less than, say, the concept of
what is legally obscene, seems simple enough in itself, but describing
either a photon’s behavior or the bounds of the legally obscene in an
understandable, genuinely articulate way is surprisingly difficult.77
This distinction between the object and its description or understanding does however seem especially complex or even doubtful in
the legal context. In some respects, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to separate what the law is from someone’s understanding or description of the law. Is there really a law of future interests apart
from what someone understands that law to be?78 The laws of future
interests cannot, in this sense, be like a genuine, but as yet undiscovered, law of nature. On the other hand, it is easy to believe that
the real operation of our legal system in its sociological and psychological dimensions could be partially unknown to us, and discoverable only through special effort.79 In some respects, ontological and
epistemic legal complexity are inseparable, but in other respects,
they are not.
Where ontological and epistemic legal complexity can be separated, should we nonetheless assume that they will be strongly posi76. See, e.g., Steven O. Kimbrough, On Simplicity as a Guide to Truth, 9 KINESIS 55,
63-64 (1979); Daniel N. Osherson & Scott Weinstein, 57 PHIL. SCI. 266, 267 (1990) (distinguishing, in parallel fashion, between metaphysical simplicity and formal simplicity);
Rudner, supra note 64, at 110.
77. See, e.g., 1 R. FEYNMAN, R. LEIGHTON & M. SANDS, THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON
PHYSICS §§ 37-2 to 37-9 (1963) (discussing wave/particle dualism). One might contend that
our verbal or mathematical description of a photon and its behavior is in itself simple, but
that we do not know what to make of that simple description. Even if we say this, we are
still left with a contrast between narrow descriptive simplicity and the difficulties involved
in really understanding either our own description or the underlying phenomenon, the
photon itself. In the context of obscenity, consider the oft-quoted assertion of Justice Potter
Stewart that hard-core obscenity is both readily recognizable and difficult to legally define.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). This may not show that obscenity in itself
is simple, but difficult to both know and describe. It may instead suggest a further complication: it may be simple to know or recognize a legal idea, but complex to describe or articulate it.
78. For a possible alternative, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, question 91, art. 1, in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 11, 11-12 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953).
79. Consider, for example, the study conducted by David Baldus concerning the racial
dimensions of death penalty cases referred to in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286
(1987), or, at a broader level, the study of economic and class dimensions of the law in
CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 33 (1913), and on the question of the authority of the law, TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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tively correlated? Where the law in itself is simple, should we expect
our descriptions of that law to be simple also? Light may be simple,
but its description may not. As it turns out, any such general assumption grossly oversimplifies legal reality.
One problem is that there are likely to be various ways of accurately describing any legal reality. Perhaps none of these descriptions of legal reality is simply wrong. Some may seem relatively simple, others more complex, and they may or may not also be mutually
translatable. Different social groups may reasonably emphasize different legal dimensions. Police procedure in an arrest may be described differently on different sides of town. In such cases, we can
hardly say that the description of legal reality is just simple. Nor can
we say that the legal reality is just complex. One dimension of the legal complexity may be that some social groups perceive the law as
relatively simple. Consistent group oppression, for example, may not
require much descriptive complexity or much nuance. Some sort of
choice, or choices, among alternative descriptions of simplicity and
complexity, based on value judgments, must be made instead.
Consider a very loosely corresponding problem in mathematics.
Assume there is a number called PI and that we want to describe it .
Verbally, we can characterize PI as the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter. Numerically, we can characterize PI as equal to
3.1415926 . . . with a potentially endless succession of refining digits.
Whether we choose the verbal or the numerical approach depends
upon our interests, and we can certainly translate one approach into
the other.
But we cannot say, however, that the two approaches are equally
complex. At the very least, they are not equally complex in the same
respects. The numerical approach is, depending on our interests, of
potentially endless length, with an infinite number of digits involved.
Beyond some point, the numbers cannot readily be memorized. The
numerical approach is in these respects complex. In contrast, the
verbal formula for PI is simpler in that it is compact and can readily
be memorized. The verbal formula may also be easy to visualize. On
the other hand, if we want to do some sort of practical calculation,
using the numerical formulation of PI, to all the decimal places we
need, is a good deal more manageable and less complex than trying
to use a visual image or a verbal formula.80

80. A bit more realistically, early twentieth-century physicists faced a choice, based
on their own interests, between two actually equivalent, but more and less complicated approaches to the development of quantum mechanics. See, e.g., David C. Cassidy, Heisenberg, Uncertainty, and the Quantum Revolution, 266 SCI. AM. 106, 109 (1992) (contrasting
Erwin Schrodinger’s wave mechanical approach with Werner Heisenberg matrix mechanical approach, with each taking the other’s approach to be generally more complicated, if
not repellant).
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Consider, now, an example from the law. Let us assume that there
is a difference between free speech law and descriptions, understandings, or declarations of free speech law. In this case, the ontological
complexity of free speech law (in itself) might then either mirror or
depart from its epistemic (or descriptive) complexity. Is there any
reason to suppose that the ontological complexity of free speech law
must march in lockstep with its epistemic complexity? Is it not
equally plausible to argue that given its phrasing and underlying
purposes, free speech law, itself, may actually be simple, and its interpretation or description quite complex? We often suppose that we
are trying to somehow correctly interpret what amounts to a brief,
readily memorized, simply formulated passage in the First Amendment.81 For whatever reasons, our attempts at interpreting what is in
several respects a simple constitutional command in the first
amendment have resulted in a remarkably complex descriptive enterprise.
Thus while the text of the Free Speech Clause, and perhaps even
its purposes, may seem simple enough, a search of a standard legal
research database turned up 14,515 federal court decisions at least
referring to “free speech” or “freedom of speech,” most presumably interpreting and applying that apparently simple constitutional
clause.82 Many of these cases are not purely mechanical exercises. In
this respect, we seem to have both ontological legal simplicity and
epistemic legal complexity. These two forms of legal complexity thus
do not seem to march hand in hand.
It is certainly possible to try to establish a stronger correlation between ontological and epistemic legal complexity. It is perfectly natural, for example, to say that the 14,515 federal free speech cases are
themselves part of the “being” or entity of free speech law itself,
rather than merely epistemic attempts to interpret, report, or describe an underlying entity known as free speech law. On this justifiable approach, free speech law is apparently quite complex. However,
no interesting correlation is established between the degree of ontological complexity and the degree of epistemic or descriptive complexity of free speech law. On such an assumption, we are now assuming
that free speech law itself is monumentally complex.

81. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech . . . .”). For some complications even at this textual level, see, for example, Mark
P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1156, 1158 (1986)
(discussing the apparent textual focus on congressional action); John Paul Stevens, The
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 (1993) (arguing that the presence of the article ‘the’ suggests a reference to some identifiable institution, practice, or subset of the
broader category of speech).
82. The Westlaw “ALLFEDS” database retrieved this remarkable number as of January 30, 1999.

732

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:715

If the case law interpretations are just part of the underlying entity of free speech itself, we would then have to ask whether our description or understanding of that large body of free speech case law
must be comparably complex. This is hardly assured. Complicated
things, such as the numerical PI, may have quite simple verbal or
visual descriptions. By comparison, a parallel search for federal cases
referring to “second amendment” or to the phrase “bear arms”
yielded 1,526 cases,83 or only about one-ninth of the total free speech
cases. Can we conclude both that the Free Speech Clause is much
more complex than the Second Amendment, and that the Second
Amendment is easier to grasp than free speech?
We might ask whether our leading theories and interpretations of
this assumedly complex free speech law are themselves proportionately complex. It is hard to see why we must say so. Admittedly, most
of our rather diverse leading theories of free speech law are not especially difficult to capsulize.84 Many of their more detailed conclusions
may not flow from their basic premises any more rigorously than
some alternative conclusions. The theories often agree on much and
thus substantially overlap. That free speech theorists differ does not
make their theories complex. Even if we choose to call our leading
free speech theories complex, it is not easy to see why they are more
complex than our leading theories of the assumedly less complex
Second Amendment. Is it clear that we understand the Second
Amendment better than the free speech clause?
Undoubtedly, there is far greater academic or theoretical interest
in free speech law than in Second Amendment law.85 Our stake in
free speech is doubtless higher. Free speech cases are understandably litigated far more often. But this hardly means that our leading
free speech theory is much more complex than our leading second
amendment theory. It is not as though there is some patent understanding of the Second Amendment, applicable by consensus to the
major Second Amendment contexts. However we come out on this
comparison, it is but one example.

83. This figure was also obtained from the Westlaw “ALLFEDS” database on January
30, 1999. Admittedly, these two searches are not comprehensive in formulation and scope,
or even structurally parallel, but the basic proportions seem evident.
84. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); LEE
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH
(1996); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
85. A search of the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews database on January 30, 1999
yielded a total of 574 articles with either “free speech” or “freedom of speech” in their title,
and only 84 articles with either “second amendment” or “bear arms” in their title. But see
supra note 84.
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In general, and more broadly, we do not see any clear association
between the complexity of the law itself and the complexity of any
given attempt to describe or justify that law.86 Again by way of analogy, a remarkably complicated decimal series might be quite simply
described, perhaps, as the square root of two. If, on the other hand,
we deny any contrast between ontological and epistemic legal complexity, we still cannot escape epistemic legal complexity in a broadly
pragmatic sense.87
This pragmatic sense of epistemic complexity focuses on the “resources . . . of time, energy, [and] ingenuity”88 required for the “cognitive domestication”89 of a legal system, code, rule, or opinion. A system, whether legal90 or non-legal,91 that is easier to understand than
another is, in that pragmatic respect, simpler. For instance, it has
been said that one form of simplicity involves memorability.92 In this
sense, “[t]he simpler statement is easier to remember.”93 Alternatively, epistemic complexity in the broad pragmatic sense may take
the form of relying on “transcendent or generalized”94 concepts. In
some sense, deep or transcendent ideas obviously involve complexity.
It seems undeniable that legal rules that are easy to remember—
whether we include the Free Speech Clause or not—may be complex
in one or more other respects. Legal rules regarding perpetuities,
cause-in-fact, or proximate cause, for example, may be easy to state
or memorize but difficult and costly to use and apply.
Each of the dimensions of epistemic complexity is, at least in part,
a matter of how the system, code, rule, or opinion is linguistically expressed.95 Consider, for example, a hypothetical criminal code consisting, in its entirety, of the injunction to avoid evil.96 This code is
epistemically complex in relying on generalized or transcendent
86. Broadening the focus, in an admittedly rather speculative way, to constitutional
theory more generally, it would be easy to argue that our leading general constitutional
theories are not much more complex than are theories of any particular constitutional provision. Perhaps the most complex leading general constitutional theory is that developed
by Professor Phillip Bobbitt. See PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7. (1982).
Therein, Professor Bobbitt argues that there are no more and no less than six equal status
modes of constitutional interpretation. See id. (referring to the historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical modes of constitutional interpretation).
87. See Bunge, supra note 73, at 121.
88. RESCHER, supra note 44, at 16.
89. Id.
90. See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 150.
91. See Raymond D. Havens, Simplicity, a Changing Concept, 14 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 22
(1953) (noting one style of landscape architecture as “simpler in the sense of being more
regular and having a more readily apprehended plan”).
92. See H.R. Post, Simplicity in Scientific Theories, 11 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 32, 35
(1960).
93. Id.
94. Levit, supra note 48, at 268.
95. See Osherson & Weinstein, supra note 76, at 267.
96. Cf. AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 57-59 question 94, art. 2 (“[E]vil is to be avoided.”).
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ideas,97 but it is exceptionally simple in the dimensions of brevity and
concision, and in number of elements.98 It is also simple in the sense
of being easily committed to memory.99 Whether it is simple in the
sense of having its concrete implications readily graspable100 is another matter. This will, in part, be a function of the culture in which
this rule is embedded. An unusually homogeneous, authoritarian,
traditionalist culture may usually agree on what counts as avoiding
evil; other cultures will not.
In the extreme case, any member of that assumed, unusually homogeneous culture may be able to translate the injunction to avoid
evil into remarkably detailed, more or less culturally uncontroversial
precepts. The general injunction to avoid evil may, for that culture,
be nearly equivalent to some long, detailed code on which there is a
consensus. So in which senses can we say that such a criminal code
is, for any given culture, or across cultures, simple or complex? Some
cultures may find that such a brief, general criminal code can be uncontroversially translated into a much more elaborate form, and uncontroversially applied. Some cultures may not even need to make
any such conscious translation. Our culture, certainly, could not
make an uncontroversial translation of ‘avoid evil.’
We have seen that expressing the idea of PI in different ways—as
a ratio, and as an irrational number—may involve different forms of
complexity.101 Notoriously, a given idea may be easily expressed in
one language, but difficult to convey accurately in another language.102 Difficult issues of what we might call formal,103 or notational,104 or even stylistic105 complexity are inescapable.
One “translation” of a tax code provision may be complex in some
respects, where another translation of the same provision may be
simpler in those respects, yet more complex in others. Boris Bittker
has argued for tax code provisions that are understandable, at least

97. See Levit, supra note 48, at 268.
98. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
102. The words “quantum” and “theory” are themselves of ancient origin, but it would
undoubtedly be rather difficult to translate WERNER HEISENBERG’S, PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (Carl Eckart & Frank C. Hoyt trans., 1930) into Latin without
creativity and inevitable cumbersomeness.
103. See Rom Harre, Simplicity as a Criterion of Induction, 34 PHIL. 229, 229 (1959)
(seeking to distinguish formal simplicity from conceptual simplicity, or the fewness of concepts required to convey a given theory).
104. See Rudner, supra note 64, at 110 (seeking to distinguish notational from logical
and structural simplicity).
105. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
12-13 (1974).
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to legal non-specialists, if not to ordinary citizens.106 He argues in
particular that “[a]n individual may deduct” is simpler and better
than “[i]n the case of an individual, . . . there shall be allowed as a
deduction.”107 We may assume that the former is indeed stylistically
simpler. But it may, in another sense, be more complex. The admittedly cumbersome language of “in the case of an individual” suggests
the exclusion of other kinds of taxpaying entities to a somewhat
greater degree than does the reference merely to “an individual.” To
merely say that an individual can do something does not suggest
quite as strongly that other kinds of entities cannot also do the same
thing. The stylistically simpler formulation thus invites more litigation on this important issue. One could thus argue more broadly that
the stylistically simpler formulation holds open more issues and encourages more litigation, and is in a practical sense more complex.
It should not surprise us that stylistic simplicity may often leave
open more avenues for litigation, and, in that sense, be more complex. At the very least, stylistic simplicity often shifts complex determinations into the future. We may say that plain language drafting often sacrifices some forms of simplicity over the long term for
simplicity in the short term. Stylistic complexity today is usually
easy to recognize and dislike. Adjudicative complexities postponed
until tomorrow are less easy to recognize today. Failing to fully appreciate or admit such a tradeoff is certainly common. The federal
government’s current regulatory policy, for example, embodies this illusion. An important executive order holds, in particular, that “[e]ach
agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and easy to understand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty and
litigation arising from such uncertainty.”108 Maximizing stylistic simplicity and minimizing litigation born of uncertainty are both desirable, but they are not really compatible goals.
Plain and simple regulations typically invite litigation and interpretive struggle. A regulation requiring, for example, that a hazardous waste site be “cleaned up” would be stylistically simple, and easy
to grasp superficially, but would give no guidance, for example, on

106. See id. at 13; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 68 (1983) (“The desire to make legal rules more accessible motivates recurrent calls for ‘simplification’ of convoluted regimes like the tax code.”).
107. Bittker supra note 105, at 12.
108. Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993). For a recent case in which constitutional due process issues hinge largely on drafting complexity, see Walters v. Reno, 145
F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998). For discussion of some ideological uses of stylistic obscurity, see Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998). For extensive discussion of the related distinction between “mud” and “crystal” rules, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1988) (distinguishing “fuzzy, ambiguous rules” as opposed to “clear, open and shut, demarcations”).
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the crucial issue of “how clean is clean.”109 One might respond by saying that regulations that give little real guidance cannot truly be
readily graspable, or genuinely simple in language, form, or style.
But this is either not always true, or it shows that there are more,
and more poorly correlated forms of complexity than we imagined.
Simple language can sometimes give little concrete guidance, as in
the case of the injunction to avoid evil. It is certainly possible, as
well, to reduce litigation by providing clearly in the regulation itself
for the proper outcomes of some common kinds of specific cases.
In fact, there is plainly more than one form of stylistic complexity,
and these forms of stylistic complexity need not correlate well with
each other. We commonly distinguish, for example, between semantic
simplicity110 and syntactic simplicity. Semantics refers to the meaning of some unit or level of a system, legal or otherwise.111 Syntax, in
contrast, refers to the grammatical or other structural relationships
in a unit of legal or other expression. Somewhat different definitions
of syntax and semantics are certainly possible.112 We could, in any
event, easily imagine a statute or other legal text that is semantically simple and syntactically complex, or vice versa. In this context,
as in the others considered above, legal complexity is itself almost
bewilderingly complex, with the various forms of legal complexity
cutting across or otherwise failing to correlate with one another.
III. OUR INABILITY TO MEASURE COMPLEXITY: SOME DEEPER
ISSUES, ILLUSTRATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Even at its barest and simplest, complexity has turned out to be
complicated.113 We have oversimplified by assuming generally that
cases of most of the various forms of complexity will be obvious, when

109. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 11-12 (1993). For the more general point that statutory or regulatory
formal simplicity may simply shift complexity forward in time, to the forum of litigation,
see Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2010 (1989).
110. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 48, at 268; Bunge, supra note 73, at 121.
111. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 276 n.62 (1993); Brian Leiter, Incommensurability: Truth or Consequences?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1998).
112. See supra notes 110-111 (linking syntax to form or structure, and semantics to
presuppositions); REED DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING 33 (1981) (semantics,
in part, as a matter of reference).
113. See discussion supra Part II. For a further puzzle from the more antiseptic realm
of simple mathematics, consider which is simpler: the fraction 1/3, or the fraction 1/500.
The first requires fewer digits, and is more readily memorized, but it is irrational, and for
some purposes infinitely more complicated, or at least lengthier, when expressed as a
decimal. See Robert Ackerman, Inductive Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 152, 154 (1961) (comparing 1/3 and 1/10).
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in fact, legal complexities are sometimes “submerged.”114 Even an
oversimplified analysis, however, can establish some useful conclusions. We cannot, for example, just decide that the law in general, or
even some particular law, is too complex and should be simplified.
Our point is not that just simplifying a law is politically difficult or
undesirable. It is, instead, that it is conceptually impossible. By way
of an extremely loose analogy, some things can be readily “simplified”
in the sense of being compressed, and other things cannot. It is thus
much easier, for example, to compact a cubic foot of household trash
than a cubic foot of water. Our inability to just compress or simplify
the law goes beyond practical difficulties to a more conceptual level.
A. The Hearsay Rule Example
To further illustrate these points, let us consider an additional example or two. We may profitably focus on areas of the law that are
thought of as complex. Let us focus first on the hearsay rule, and
then on a problem within free speech law. Certainly, the evidentiary
hearsay rule, along with its many exceptions, is commonly thought of
as relatively complex.115 But even the hearsay rule cannot be complex
in every respect. We may certainly rank the hearsay rule, with its
exceptions, as complex in the sense of involving many exceptions.116
Perhaps we can say that the hearsay rule with its exceptions is operationally complex.117 The rule with its exceptions may also be epistemically complex, at least in the sense of being difficult to memorize,
if not to grasp.118
The hearsay rule, even with its exceptions, does not on the other
hand seem especially complex in other respects. We may think of the
hearsay rule as having many parts, but we could easily reduce the
number of parts of the rule by merely conjoining them into one (relatively long) formulation.119 Do we think of the hearsay rule as having
great variety among its parts?120 Is the hearsay rule complex in a hierarchical or other organizational sense?121 Can parties not often
114. The constitutional references to cases or controversies has, for example, been said
to have “an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities . . . .” Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) (quoting Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968)).
115. See, e.g., People v. Pennington, 318 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to “the complexity of the hearsay rule and the numerous exceptions thereto”) (quoting
People v. Moncure, 288 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)); Henslee v. Monks, 571
P.2d 440, 442 n.2 (Okla. 1977) (referring to “the complexity of the subject” of hearsay)
(quoting Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974)).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77, 87-89.
119. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying note 49.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 58-69.
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stipulate or “contract around” the hearsay rule?122 Do more assumptions underlie the hearsay rule than other rules?123 Is the hearsay
rule semantically124 or syntactically125 complex? Could we not conclude that the hearsay rule is complex in some respects and simple in
others, perhaps precisely because it is complex in those initial respects? Whether the hearsay rule is really complex is, at worst, irrelevant or unanswerable, and, at best, a matter of a contestable
judgment of typically conflicting values and interests.
Thus, a lawyer who sees the complexities of the hearsay rule as a
barrier to personal entry,126 or as a disincentive to compete with established litigators, and who views this as important, will likely see
the hearsay rule as complex. A law student who is required to memorize and apply all of the hearsay exceptions will likely see the rule as
complex also. These may be the most commonly encountered perspectives on the hearsay rule, but they certainly do not exhaust all the
potential perspectives. A litigator already an expert on hearsay, who
faces low “compliance costs,”127 may consider the hearsay rule simpler than other less easily grasped rules. Someone interested in the
structure of the legal system128 may not consider the hearsay rule
particularly complex. A legal theorist who is interested in the purposes of particular laws may well believe that the purpose of the
hearsay rule and its exceptions is relatively simple.129 A legal semanticist may find the hearsay rule simpler than, say, most modern
statutory provisions. The hearsay rule can be stated in relatively
simple words; no special terminology or technical terms need be invoked.
The view that the hearsay rule is particularly complex is held
more commonly than the opposite, but such a view is not, on that basis, more genuinely correct. Whether we see the hearsay rule as complex or as simple is instead a reflection of which of the various legitimate interests and perspectives we identify with most strongly.
Neither general view is better than the other.

122. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 110-15.
125. See id.
126. For some informal discussion of this concept in other contexts, see Panel Discussion: Market Power and Entry Barriers, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 701 (1989).
127. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of California Press 2d ed. 1967).
129. Someone might imagine, for example, that both the rule itself and the exceptions
reflect a moderate distrust of ordinary jurors. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in
Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1970).
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B. The Public Forum Debates
We see a generally similar, but richer, pattern in the context of
free speech law. The free speech clause of the Constitution130 is itself
short,131 simply phrased,132 and unitary.133 Arguably, the Free Speech
Clause may be viewed as having only a single underlying purpose.134
On the other hand, one could equally argue that the primary purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause are irreducibly multiple.135
It seems entirely sensible to argue that free speech law should, in
some fashion, be “informed by the complex tangle of social, political,
and cultural interests in limiting speech as well as protecting it, for
the tension between individual rights and community needs is at the
core of every First Amendment issue.”136 There are certainly a number of somewhat distinct free speech doctrines and judicial tests,137
but the degree to which this apparent differentiation conceals a
deeper unity is contested.138
Free speech law is thus complex in a number of respects, and simple in others. Whether we call free speech complex depends upon our
contestable choices of the characteristics we wish to attach most
weight to. The problem of assigning some particular degree of complexity to any area of free speech law is itself more complex. Some
areas of free speech law, and some particular free speech tests, can
easily be described as either simple or complex.
Consider, for example, the current state of the public forum doctrine, the law that purportedly controls the government regulation of
speech by private parties on or through government-owned property.139 Public forum doctrine recognizes three categories of public

130. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech”).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 110-15.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
134. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). In a broader sense, see Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 255, 301 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
135. See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982);
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1213 (1983).
136. Z.J. Gifts D-2 v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998).
137. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1087-1529 (3d ed.
1996) (discussing free speech tests for a number of contexts, including, subversive advocacy, speech by public school students, public employee speech, libel, commercial speech,
labor union elections, pornography, hate speech, etc.).
138. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. For an attempt, in another context, to reduce complexity in free speech law, see R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9
PACE L. REV. 57 (1989).
139. See, e.g., International Soc’y For Krishna Consciousness Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
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fora. The first category is that of traditional public fora,140 such as
public parks and downtown sidewalks, where free speech is strongly
protected.141 More relevant for our purposes are the second and third:
the designated public forum and the nonpublic forum.
The distinction between designated public fora and nonpublic fora
is important, as the tests for permissible restriction of speech in
these two types of fora differ significantly. Generally, restrictions on
speech in designated public fora are strongly disfavored, ordinarily
drawing strict scrutiny, as in the case of traditional public fora.142
Thus, restrictions on access to designated public fora ordinarily are
tested by requiring a compelling governmental interest and narrow
tailoring—in other words, a close fit between the governmental purpose and the scope of the restriction on speech.143 By contrast, the
general constitutional test for restrictions on speech in nonpublic
fora is more lenient. Such restrictions need only be “reasonable”144
and not based on opposition to the restricted speaker’s point of
view.145
Thus restrictions on, or exclusions from, designated public fora
are more difficult to justify than in the case of nonpublic fora. But
this difference will come into play only after we have decided that a
given forum is either a designated forum or a nonpublic forum in the
first place. And this choice, in turn, should depend upon the judicial
definitions of these two kinds of fora. But it is these definitions, and
the distinction between the two fora, that raise the difficult problems.
A designated public forum, we are told, refers to “’property that
the State has opened for expressive activity by all or part of the public.’”146 Even in a designated public forum, some portion of the range
of potential speakers can be excluded.147 Designated public fora,

& Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Perry Education Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (recognizing that the government
is limited when regulating speech in traditional public fora.)
141. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (permitting government exclusion of a speaker
from such a forum only where “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest”). See also Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998).
142. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-79 (1998)
(recognizing that the government must have a compelling interest to regulate speech in a
public forum.)
143. See id.; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
144. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-79.
145. See id.; Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 371-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (“When deciding
what may be displayed in a nonpublic forum, the government may exercise considerable
selectivity . . . provided it does not transgress basic anti-discrimination rules.”).
146. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (quoting International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)).
147. See id.

2000]

ILLUSION OF SIMPLICITY

741

therefore, are typically available for only a particular class of speakers.148 The law distinguishes between access for individual speakers
and access for a class of speakers.149 Whole classes of speakers can
thus be excluded from designated public fora.
How, we might then wonder, does a nonpublic forum differ from a
designated public forum? The distinction exists between general and
selective access to the forum.150 But what we have already said about
designated public fora sounds like selective access.151 What is the real
difference between the accessibility of designated public fora and of
nonpublic fora? To clarify the distinction, the Supreme Court has
said that a designated public forum involves access for “a certain
class of speakers,”152 whereas a nonpublic forum involves access for “a
particular class of speakers”153 who must, as groups or individuals,
obtain permission before using the facility for speech purposes.154
Thus, at this point there is either supposed to be a crucial difference between a “certain class” (designated public fora) and a “particular class” (nonpublic fora) of speakers, which seems highly
unlikely, or between something like a need for repeated or particularized government permission to speak and the absence of such a requirement. On the latter theory, the select class would need some
sort of permission to speak in nonpublic fora, but not in designated
public fora. But the latter distinction seems doubtful at best. Surely,
for example, college students must often, as groups or individuals,
obtain permission to use public university facilities for speech purposes, even if the facility is classed as a designated public forum. College students, as groups or individuals, do not simply waltz into designated public fora such as public university auditoriums and begin
speaking. Access to designated public fora typically requires permission.
At a minimum, public universities will want to require such permission in order to allocate limited space when potentially conflicting
demands arise. Individualized permission requirements may be imposed regarding both designated public fora and nonpublic fora. Is
the idea then that in the case of nonpublic fora, access may be denied
on more substantive grounds, apart from scheduling conflicts? This
idea will not help us distinguish designated from nonpublic fora. Ac148. See id. at 677 (citing, among other cases, United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at
726-27) (O’Connor, J., for the plurality)).
149. See id. at 677.
150. See id.; see also Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d
695, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (indicating selectivity and restriction of access as marking a nonpublic forum).
151. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
152. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.
153. Id.
154. See id. (discussing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)).
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cess to designated public fora can be denied on substantive grounds
as well, such as an insufficiently clear attachment to the university.155
If there is any real difference between a designated public forum
and a nonpublic forum, that difference is, even at a theoretical level,
modest, if not elusive.156 The former kind of forum evokes a more rigorous constitutional test than the latter, but the difference between
the two fora is minimal at best. Both can be restricted to a class of
permitted speakers, and both can involve continuing non-trivial access permission requirements.
This quite minimal difference between designated and nonpublic
fora thus leaves the outcome of many public forum cases almost completely indeterminate. As a practical matter, great discretion is held
by courts in making this often decisive classification. What, then, can
be said about the degree of complexity of free speech law in this respect? Unavoidably, we must again say that this aspect of public forum doctrine is both relatively simple and extremely complex. The
distinction between the two kinds of fora is binary, is supposed to be
expressed briefly in simple terms, and the doctrine evokes two
clearly stated corresponding tests. On the other hand, the distinction
between the two kinds of fora is elusive in practice, leading to enormous indeterminacy of judicial outcome. If we are able to predict how
a judge will use this distinction, this reflects only minimally our
knowledge of the facts and the law, and far more our knowledge of
the particular judge’s proclivities and practices.
In this respect, we may say that the apparent simplicity of this
aspect of the public forum doctrine is largely an illusion. It may be
quite simple for a cynical or realistic judge to choose a preferred classification and then rationalize the choice. The apparent simplicity is
really a matter of displacing or shifting the complexity onto those actors who must predict what courts will do, and onto those actors who
wish to make free speech law determinate in this area—and in that
sense simple.
Matters are far from simple for those who must predict how courts
in general will apply this distinction between the two kinds of fora.
More broadly, we may say that both the real and apparent simplicity
of the Free Speech Clause is mainly a matter of projecting the complexities across time onto those who devise constitutional doctrines
and tests, and, then, onto those who must predict judicial outcomes
155. See id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 (“We have not held . . . that a campus
must make all of its facilities equally available to student[s] and nonstudents alike, or that
a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.”).
156. For a broader critique of the public forum doctrine, see Daniel A. Farber & John
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
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and apply the doctrines and tests in their own lives as citizens and
government officials.
Could the public forum doctrine, and other areas of free speech
law, be made more determinate, and, at least in that respect, simpler? Certainly; but transforming the open-ended nature of public forum doctrine into a more determinate, more predictable form is itself
complex work. More importantly, when we have finished this work,
so that we now understand the boundary between designated and
nonpublic fora in various contexts, in all their concrete particularity,
we will unavoidably have a legal understanding of that distinction
that has itself become quite complex. If such an understanding does
not amount to a vast catalog of particular institutional and speaker
circumstances of every variety, with the preferred outcomes for each,
it must at least approach that cumbersome extreme.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law in general, and individual laws in particular, cannot be
just simplified; this is not so much because the law in practice resists
simplification, but for deeper reasons. As we have seen, simplifying a
law in some respect hardly guarantees that the law will be simplified
in all respects. Typically, as we have seen, legal complexity, in one
respect, is at best uncorrelated with legal complexity in other respects.157 Simplifying a law in one respect typically leaves the law
complex in other respects. Indeed, simplifying a law in one respect
may well make that law, or some other law, more complex in other
respects, now or in the future.158
We face rather difficult questions of value and conflicting interests
before we can, on the basis of those contestable value judgments,
conclude that we have really simplified the law. To say otherwise
would be like claiming that it is just really desirable that some particular baseball team win the next World Series. Contestable value
judgments underlie such claims.

157. See discussion supra Part II. For additional theoretical support, see, for example,
McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1270 (“[S]ome very simple terms yield a dizzying array of interpretations . . . . In sum, there is no consistent correlation among statutory mass, abstruseness, and complexity.”).
158. See discussion supra Part II. For additional theoretical support, see Steven Walt,
Book Review, 109 ETHICS 193, 194 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR
A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) and noting that “[t]he different criteria sometimes work against
each other”) and John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (explaining that, in
tax law, “the use of elaborative complexity is intended to reduce judgmental [i.e., interpretive] complexity”). See also, J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96
YALE L.J. 743, 746-47 (1987) (referring to Jacques Derrida’s citation of the simple and the
complex as a hierarchical opposition that is subject to inversion or temporary reversal).
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Even this limited possibility for legal simplification assumes that
what we take as a law’s simplicity cannot be redescribed as complex.
But this is itself an oversimplification. As we have seen, a description
of the law as “simple” can often be translated into a description
marking the law as complex.159 This possibility further muddies the
waters.
Finally, even if we can all agree that we have simplified the law in
some respect, we may have only displaced the complexity of the law
forward or backward in the overall lawmaking and implementation
process, or we may have merely shifted the complexity to some other
element of the broader political system. Simplicity in style or vocabulary may store up uncertainties for future litigation. Ultimately, the
law is as simple or as complex as it is, in whatever respect, because
that degree of simplicity or complexity is consistent with the current,
broad balance of legal and political forces. Wanting the law to be
simpler, in some respect, is merely a part of the play of such legal
and political forces and does not transcend the play of such forces.
Determinacy and predictability in the law are thus purchased
only at the cost of introducing great complexity in other arguably important respects. Substantial complexity in the law is, again, in this
respect inescapable. The quest for real simplification in the law remains hopeless.

159. See discussion supra Part II. For some additional discussion, see, for example,
Balkin, supra note 158, at 746-47. Within a narrower Anglo-American philosophical tradition, see Bunge, supra note 73, at 121 (stating that the number of elements in a system
can, at least in a sense, be reduced to one by merely combining them); Nelson Goodman,
Safety, Strength, Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 150, 151 (1961) (“[W]e can always, by a calculated selection of vocabulary, translate any hypothesis into one of minimal length . . . “)
and Willard Van Orman Quine, On Simple Theories of a Complex World, 15 SYNTHESE 103,
103 (1963) (“Simplicity is not easy to define. But it may be expected, whatever it is, to be
relative to the texture of a conceptual scheme.”); Howard L. Rolston, A Note On Simplicity
as a Principle for Evaluating Rival Scientific Theories, 43 PHIL. SCI. 438, 438 (1976) (discussing Quine’s argument that “simplicity is relative to a conceptual schema”).

